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ABSTRACT
In unpredictable software manufacturer organizations, it is
difficult to determine when a software product will be released,
the features the product will have, the associated development
costs or the resulting product quality. The NPVI-method is
presented, enabling a software manufacturer to compare and
evaluate different release or market entry strategies. However,
information has its price in time and cost, forcing decision-makers
to make a trade-off between search costs and opportunity costs. In
addition, decision-makers simplify the real world, as they cannot
escape the diverse psychological forces that influence individual
behaviour. Combined with the potential presence of sources of
conflict, this often leads to the situation where different
stakeholders experience difference aspiration levels. As such,
satisficing behaviour where decision-makers try to find consensus
and choose a satisfactory release alternative is a good
characterisation of the software release decision-making process
as found in practice. Successful adoption of the NPVI-method
requires that software manufacturers reach the zone of cost
effectiveness for the perfection of information; a zone where
numbers make business sense, and can be convincingly used to
support informed decision-making.

Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.8 [Software Engineering]: Metrics – process metrics,
product metrics.
K.6.3 [Management of Computing and Information Systems]:
Software Management – software development, software
maintenance.

General Terms
Management, Measurement, Economics.

Keywords
Optimal release time, maximizing behaviour, optimizing
behaviour, satisficing behaviour, decision-making.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A relatively unexplored area in the field of software management
is the release or market entry decision, deciding whether or not a
software product can be transferred from its development phase to
operational use. As many software manufacturers behave in an
unpredictable manner [1] [12], they have difficulty in determining
the ‘right’ moment to release their software products. It is a tradeoff between an early release, to capture the benefits of an earlier
market introduction, and the deferral of product release, to
enhance functionality, or improve quality. A release decision is a
trade-off where, in theory, the objective is to maximize the
economic value. Inputs into the release decision are expected cash
inflows and outflows if the product is released. What is the market
window? What are the additional pre-release development costs
when continuing testing and the expected post-release
maintenance costs when releasing now?

2. MAXIMIZING BEHAVIOUR
A market entry decision is a trade-off between early release to
capture the benefits of an earlier market introduction (a larger
installed base), and the deferral of product release to enhance
functionality, or improve quality. For many software
manufacturers, especially those operating in mass markets, this is
the point of no return. At first sight, this trade-off seems not to be
of any special nature, from a strictly economic perspective. If a
software product is released ‘too early’, a software product with
less functionality and/or significant defects would be released to
intended users and the software manufacturer incurs post-release
costs of later fixing failures. If a software product is released ‘too
late’, the additional development cost, and the opportunity cost, of
missing a market window could be substantial. These two
alternatives need to be compared, to determine which alternative
maximizes economic value (revenues minus costs). When the
perspective of maximizing behaviour is assumed, the primary
objective of a software manufacturer is to maximize long-term
expected value. In that case, it is needed to be able to evaluate and
compare different market entry strategies: which strategy will
maximize economic value?
Product life-cycle models, as for instance frequently used in the
semiconductor industry, can be used to demonstrate the effects on
revenues of a delayed market entry [5] [6] [15]. By extending
these models with cost functions for pre-release development
costs and post-release operational costs the effects on profits can
be calculated as well. Based on these profit models, a method was
defined using the NPV capital budgeting method. Different
alternatives can be evaluated by comparing their NPV values.
Erdogmus introduces a method for comparative evaluation of

software development strategies based on NPV-calculations, used
to compare custom-built systems and systems based on
Commercial ‘Off the Shelf’ (COTS) software [2]. Erdogmus
distinguishes comparison metrics for various variables that
influence the NPV of a project. This method was used as the basis
for the definition of a method to reflect market entry decisions for
software-intensive systems. The resulting so-called NPVI-method
expresses the difference between two alternatives in a single
variable. This variable, called the Net Present Value Incentive, is
calculated from various underlying metrics, and measures the
economic incentive to favour one alternative over another. The
metrics are classified into premium metrics at the lowest level,
advantage metrics at the medium level and incentive metrics at
the highest level. See Figure 1. This method allows the
comparison of different alternatives during different project
phases, including release alternatives.

Ma) when the product is transferred to the operational phase and is
the contribution of the Short-term Maintenance Premium SMP
(corrective maintenance) and the Long-term Maintenance
Premium LMP (adaptive/perfective maintenance):
OCA

= log Mb – log Ma
= log Mb - log [ Mb - Mb . (SMP + LMP) ]
= log [ 1 / (1 - SMP - LMP) ]
= - log ( 1 - SMP - LMP )

The Asset Value Advantage AVA (expected future cash inflows)
and the Operational Cost Advantage OCA (expected future cash
outflows) are combined in the Net Asset Value Advantage NAVA:
NAVA = log NAVa – log NAVb
= log (Ca – Ma) + log (Cb – Mb)
= log ( eAVACb – Mb/eOCA ) – log NAVb

NPVI
Net Present Value Incentive

DCI
Development Cost
Incentive

PVI
Present Value Incentive

LMP
Long-term Maintenance Premium

SMP
Short-term Maintenance Premium

DCA
Development Cost Advantage
( = log Ib - log Ia )

= [ 1 / (1 + r) Tb ] . [ e NAVA / (1 + r) Ta - Tb – 1 ]

OCA
Operational Cost Advantage
( = log M b - log M a )

PRP
Product Reliability Premium

PFP
Product Functionality Premium

EEP
Early Entry Premium

DTA
Development Time Advantage
( = log Tb - log Ta )

= [ PVa – PVb ] / NAVb
= [ (NAVa / (1 + r) Ta) - (NAVb / (1 + r) Tb) ] / NAVb

NAVA
Net Asset Value Advantage

with:
ȕ

= [ 1 / (1 + r) Tb ] . [ e NAVA / (1 + r) ȕ – 1 ]

(4)

= Tb [ (1/eDTA) – 1 ]

(5)

The Development Cost Incentive DCI is the normalized
difference of the development cost between the two alternatives Ib
and Ia considered:
DCI
= ( Ib – Ia ) / Ib
= 1 – (1 / eDCA)

(6)

This leads to the final Net Present Value Incentive NPVI,
normalized to the project scale:

Figure 1. Breakdown of NPV Incentive to Lower-level
Metrics.
At the lowest level, two categories of premium metrics are
distinguished:
Asset value premiums. Three variables influencing the asset
value are considered, namely early market entry (EEP), product
functionality (PFP) and product reliability (PRP).
Operational cost premiums. Two variables influencing the
operational cost are considered, namely the short-term costs for
corrective maintenance (SMP) and the long-term costs for
adaptive/perfective maintenance (LMP).
The Asset Value Advantage AVA is equal to the expected increase
in future cash inflows [difference between the two alternatives Ca
and Cb] and is the contribution of the Early Entry Premium EEP,
the Product Functionality Premium PFP and the Product
Reliability Premium PRP:
AVA = log Ca – log Cb
= log [ Cb + Cb . (EEP + PFP + PRP) ] – log Cb
= log ( 1 + EEP + PFP + PRP )

(3)

The Present Value Incentive PVI is derived from the Net Asset
Value Advantage NAVA, taking into account the discount rate r
and normalizing it to the base alternative NAVb:
PVI

AVA
Asset Value Advantage
( = log Ca - log Cb )

(2)

(1)

The Operational Cost Advantage OCA is equal to the future cash
outflows savings (difference between the two alternatives Mb and
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NPVI

= ( NPVa – NPVb ) / ( NAVb + Ib )
= ( PVa – Ia – PVb + Ib ) / ( NAVb + Ib )
= ( PVI . NAVb + DCI . Ib ) / ( NAVb + Ib )

(7)

The original method was developed to compare different product
development strategies for making investment appraisals. The
adjusted method can be used in a similar fashion but more
accurately reflects specific criteria related to a software release
decision: reliability and expected short-term and long-term
maintenance costs. Due to its general nature, the adjusted method
may also be used during product development, for example, to
compare and evaluate different product development strategies,
architecture or design alternatives and technology adoption
strategies.

3. OPTIMIZING BEHAVIOUR
Maximizing behaviour assumes that decision-makers have
complete information about costs and benefits associated with
each option. They compare the options on a single scale of
preference, value or utility. Modern behavioural economics
acknowledge however, that the assumption of perfect (complete

and reliable) information is implausible. Etzioni and Amitai argue
that because, normally, limitations on information will exist, it is
impossible to undertake the precise analysis necessary to
maximize economic objectives [3]. Many economists put similar,
and other arguments, against the case for maximizing behaviour
[4] [7]. Rather than assuming decision-makers possess all relevant
information for making choices, information is, itself, treated as a
commodity, something that has a price in time and/or money.
This argument of limitations on information can be used to
‘soften’ maximizing behaviour to optimizing behaviour, where an
individual decision-maker makes a trade-off between information
perfection (completeness and reliability) and the cost related to
searching for additional information.
This relationship is given in Figure 2. On the horizontal axis,
Information perfection is measured, which is knowledge about the
decision outcome of an alternative. When information perfection
equals 100%, the information is complete and reliable, or,
supposedly, perfect. The vertical axis measures the value, cost
and yield (marginal value) as a function of information perfection
on the horizontal axis. Value refers to how desirable a particular
decision outcome is considering the value of the alternative,
whether in money, satisfaction or other benefit. The value curve
V(i) rises steadily. Cost is the cost involved in searching for
alternatives, for example, extending information perfection. The
cost curve C(i) moves in the opposite direction, rising rather
slowly at the start because the initial information requires
relatively little effort. Time is the time involved in searching for
alternatives and moves in the same direction as the cost function.
Additional information becomes more difficult to obtain and the
associated cost and time increase exponentially. Yield is the
difference between value and cost (net value). The yield curve
Y(i), the difference between the value and cost functions, reduces
sooner, and more steeply than the value curve. Yield represents
the net value with the point of diminishing returns, or point of
optimality Y*, the point where this curve reaches its maximum
with the corresponding values I*, V* and C*. Beyond this point,
the cost of acquiring additional information outweighs the value
or benefit.
T(i)

Value, Cost, Yield, Time

C(i)

maintenance costs. Beyond this point, the extra information leads
to additional costs that outweigh the benefits (law of diminishing
returns). It is assumed that this point of optimality can probably
not be determined precisely, neither ex ante nor post ante.
Therefore, instead of finding the point of optimality, software
manufacturers will in a practical setting be forced to search for a
zone of cost effectiveness: a bandwidth in which the marginal net
asset value is equal or close to zero. The information level is
considered to be cost effective compared to higher or lower levels
of information if it is:
(1) Less costly and at least as effective;
(2) More costly and more effective with an added efficacy
that is worth paying the additional price for;
(3) Less effective and less costly, where the additional cost
of additional information is too high for the additional
benefits provided.

4. SATISFICING BEHAVIOUR
Simon argues that limited cognitive capabilities in decisionmakers lead to simplification [11]. A decision-maker simplifies
reality, leaves out information and applies heuristics as a
consequence of limited cognitive capabilities. Reasons are, for
example, that the decision-maker has limited, unreliable or even
too much information, available, or that the search for acceptable
alternatives is felt to be too time, and cost, consuming. This
problem of computation is classically illustrated by the traveling
salesman problem in which the objective is to minimize the travel
costs of a salesperson having to visit 50 cities. The 50! calculation
is computable but not within a reasonable time horizon. He
suggests that in choice situations, people actually have the goal of
satisficing, rather than maximizing, or optimizing, and a decisionmaker applies heuristic rules of search in a heuristic frame. The
heuristic (or cognitive) frame referring to the representation of the
problem and solution space, whereas the heuristic rules of search
are the algorithms used to find solutions in this solution space
[10]. Following this approach, an alternative is satisfactory if a set
of criteria exists that minimally describes satisfactory alternatives,
and the alternative in question meets, or exceeds, all these criteria
[7]. A general corresponding strategy is [8]:
1.

V(i)
V*
Y*

T*

Y(i)

C*

0

I*

100%
100

Information perfection

Figure 2. Value (V), Cost (C), Time (T) and Yield (Y) as a
Function of Information Perfection [9].
A decision-maker should look for the point of optimality. Below
this point, uncertainty is high and might confront a software
manufacturer with releasing unexpectedly high post-release
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Set an aspiration level such that any option that reaches, or
surpasses it, is ‘good enough’. The aspiration level is the
smallest outcome deemed satisfactory.

2.

Begin to enumerate and evaluate the options on offer.

3.

Choose the first option which, given the aspiration level, is
‘good enough’.

How can this approach be integrated into the model describing
optimizing behaviour? An example is given in Figure 3,
incorporating satisficing behaviour at individual level (aspiration
level for one stakeholder or decision-maker). The aspiration level
is a horizontal line and reflects the boundary at, or above, which
the decision-maker is satisfied. The aspiration level is given by
the line V = V*´, which denotes that a decision-maker will choose
the first option reaching, or surpassing, V*´ for the value function
V(i). In the example of Figure 3, the resulting point of optimality
(I*´, Y*´) does not coincide with the point of optimality (I*, Y*) and
lies to the left. This is not necessarily the case in general.
Satisficing behaviour might also lead to setting an aspiration level
where the resulting level of information exceeds I*. In this case,

unnecessary costs are incurred, as the resulting cost value exceeds
C*.

C(i)

The aspiration level can also consist of a lower and upper
boundary. A decision-maker will accept the first option for which:
Value, Cost, Yield

 V(i)

Vlow

 Vhigh
C(i)

Value, Cost, Yield

V(i)

Aspiration level Sb
Y(i)
Aspiration level Sa

Aspiration level Sc

V(i)

100%
100

0
V* '

Information perfection

Aspiration level

Y* '

Figure 4. Adjusted Model to Incorporate Satisficing
Behaviour of Multiple Stakeholders [9].

Y(i)
C* '
100%
100

Information perfection

Figure 3. Adjusted Model to Incorporate Satisficing
Behaviour of a Single Stakeholder [9].
An aspiration level is not necessarily restricted to the value
function V(i). A decision-maker might, for example, set an
aspiration level for the information perfection itself, in which case
the aspiration level would be a vertical line in Figure 3. There
may also be aspiration levels for cost and/or time: an upper
boundary constraint Chigh for the cost function C(i) and/or an
upper boundary constraint Thigh for the time function T(i). 1 It is
obvious that a solution is only possible if the information level at
Vlow is less than, or equal to, the information level at Chigh and
Thigh: 2
V-1(Vlow) < T-1(Thigh)

It is concluded here that the notion of optimizing behaviour
(imperfect information) as discussed in the previous section, must
be extended with the notion of satisficing behaviour. A decisionmaker simplifies reality, leaves out information and applies
heuristics as a consequence of limited cognitive capabilities.
As stakeholders may apply different heuristics and one, or more,
determinants of conflict may be present, different stakeholders
may arrive at different aspiration levels during the decisionmaking process. This is illustrated in Figure 4, incorporating
satisficing behaviour at group level, and showing the different
aspiration levels for three different stakeholders Sa, Sb, and Sc. In
the ideal situation, all aspiration levels would be equal and be
within the zone of cost effectiveness (or even intersect with the
point of optimality). However, in a practical context, with high
uncertainty, this is not a likely situation.

1

Theoretically a lower boundary for these functions may exist. However it
is assumed that, in practice, these lower boundaries are equal to 0.

2

V-1(V) , C-1(C) and T-1(T) are the inverse functions of V(I), C(I) and T(I)
respectively.
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position

instrumental goal
(release date)

utility

and:

utility

V-1(Vlow) < C-1(Chigh)

Stokman explains potential differences in aspiration levels during
collective decision-making in the following way [14]. He makes a
distinction between ultimate goals and instrumental goals.
Instrumental goals are considered a means through which ultimate
goals can be realized. Utility functions for ultimate goals are
usually strictly convex (monotonously increasing or decreasing).

utility

I* '

0

ultimate goal
(customer satisfaction)

ultimate goal
(market share)

Figure 5. Example of Utility Functions of Instrumental and
Ultimate Goals [9].
Controversial decisions usually concern instrumental goals and
have an optimum: too much, or too little, is bad. The instrumental
goal of a software manufacturer during product development is to
release a product to the market. Ultimate goals may be to capture
a high market share by releasing the product as early as possible
(first-mover advantage), or to satisfy customers by delivering a
high-quality product (customer satisfaction), turning the software
release decision into a dilemma. Too late means market share will
be lost, too early means dissatisfied customers due to a lower

It is likely different stakeholders will assign different weights to
the ultimate goals, due to the inter-dependence between
stakeholders involved. In a practical setting, there may, further,
even be more than two goals, while different stakeholders will not
necessarily have identical goals: divergence in goals or objectives
is likely to be present. Differences in aspiration, among
stakeholders involved, imply one or more stakeholders must
change an initial position to reach consensus. Stokman et al.
describe three elements that determine the outcome of a decision
[13]: the positions of the stakeholders, the salience for the
stakeholders (the degree to which they are interested in each
issue) and the capabilities of the stakeholders. The process of
decision-making is described as the efforts of stakeholders to
realise an outcome of the decision as close as possible to their
own position. They distinguish three main processes and
strategies whereby a stakeholder changes his position:
Management of Meaning: the stakeholder receives
convincing information implying that another position reflects
his incentive structure better. Important aspects here are:
1. New information is generally more acceptable in earlier
stages of the decision-making than in later ones;
2. A substantial amount of trust in the provider of the
information increases the likelihood that information is
accepted as relevant and reliable.
Exchange: a stakeholder is prepared to take another position
on an issue in exchange for a reciprocal move by another
stakeholder on another issue. Three elements are of importance
here:
1. The selection of the issues one wants to include in the
exchange process.
2. The change one incorporates into one’s own positions.
3. One’s prioritisation of the issues.

the studied environments, software manufacturers are not
consciously aiming at reaching this zone of cost effectiveness. In
most cases formulated non-functional requirements like reliability
and maintainability were not deployed during product
development (design, implementation, and test). It was only
during testing that reliability again received attention, which may
be too late to guarantee a high reliability level. The level of
maintainability obtained was in none of the cases addressed. As a
result, these manufacturers faced difficulty in making firm
statements about expected post-release short-term (corrective) and
long-term (adaptive/perfective) maintenance costs. But also, the
available information regarding market windows and expected
cash inflows was severely limited. Thus, the market entry
decision-making process was in general characterized by lack of
convincing information. In these cases, the decision was made by
challenging other stakeholders’ positions (politics) and intuition.
However, such a decision-process is not favourable in situations,
where large prospective financial loss outcomes to a software
manufacturer and its customers/end-users of the software are
present and even people’s life may be at risk in for instance
safety-critical products.

6. EFFECTS OF PROCESS MATURITY
If the information level is below the zone of cost effectiveness the
pre-release cash outflows (development cost) will probably be
lower, as less effort is spent on verification activities and
implementing identified artefacts. As this incurs high
‘uncertainty’ for product reliability and product maintainability,
the expected post-release cash outflows (maintenance cost) are
likely to be higher. When the information level for product
reliability and product maintainability is increased, this incurs an
increase in pre-release cash outflows.
Yield

quality product, as in Figure 5. The optimum for the instrumental
goal depends on the weighting of all ultimate goals. In collective
decision-making, different stakeholders are likely to assign
different weights due to different heuristics, and the presence of
one, or more, determinants of conflict, leads to different
aspiration levels for the decision outcome.

Low

+
+

process maturity

Uncertainty
pre-release development cost
post-release maintenance cost

High

+
-

Challenge: other stakeholders challenge the position of a
stakeholder who feels more or less forced to change position.
This is influenced by:
1.
2.
3.

One’s own position at the beginning of the decisionmaking process.
The leverage one shows to others.
Explicit evaluation of the likelihood of success.

It is argued that a high presence of ‘management of meaning’
processes/strategies is favourable in software release decisions, as
opposed to a low presence of ‘challenge’ and ‘exchange’
processes/strategies. A high presence of ‘management of
meaning’ processes/strategies implies that possible differences in
positions or aspiration levels are reduced through the acceptance
of convincing information.

5. CASE STUDIES
Ten case studies were conducted to determine the information
level reached when software manufacturers make the market
entry decision [9]. The studied environments included
manufacturer organizations with low and higher process maturity,
operating in different markets. It was concluded that, at least in
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zone of cost
effectiveness

Information perfection

Figure 6. Economic Components as a Function of
Information Perfection [9].
However, as increasing the information will also incur the
detection and removal of residual defects, post-release cash
outflows are likely to decrease. Improving information perfection
can lead to transforming a decision with complete uncertainty
(zone of cost effectiveness to the left) to a decision with informed
uncertainty (zone of cost effectiveness moving to the right) or, at
least in theory, even a decision with certainty (zone of cost
effectiveness completely to the right). Software manufacturers
with mature product development processes are assumed to move
their zone of cost effectiveness to the right: valuable information
is obtained in less time and probably against less cost. See Figure
6. This enables them to make market entry decisions with less

uncertainty, where the decision-making process is characterized
by sharing of convincing information. As the number of scenarios
to be considered might be reduced, and the chance of occurrence
of each scenario might be better quantified with probability or
possibility values, it will make the NPVI-method a better
candidate for evaluating different market entry alternatives.

and against fewer costs. As the zone of cost effectiveness will
now reveal a higher information level, it will also lead to the
effects of reduced uncertainty, increased applicability of the
NPVI-method, and informed decision-making based on sharing
convincing information.
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